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jringo last won the day on December 6

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  1. New Coin Launch Announcement - GRC - GridCoin

    Gridcoin State of the Network Report #3 // 12-9-17 https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-state-of-the-network-report-3-12-9-17
  2. New Coin Launch Announcement - GRC - GridCoin

    Gridcoin 4.0-2018 Roadmap Progress Report #3 https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-research-4-0-2018-roadmap-progress-report-3
  3. Very simple explanation of what's wrong with Gridcoin PoS in its current state. https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/the-stake-weight-problem-what-on-earth-do-we-keep-talking-about-simplified -------------------------- I hope to explain in the simplest terms a problem with the Gridcoin Proof of Stake system which has encouraged several proposals to be developed and presented. I do not intend to talk about the proposed solutions. It should be noted that this is a problem that plagues multiple blockchains and does not present any immediate security issues, however it is still a known issue that must be fixed. Definition: The Stake Weight Problem is the problem presented when a Proof of Stake system does not encourage entities to keep their coins connected to the network. Explanation: Bitcoin is a peer to peer network which compiles blocks through a process known as Proof of Work. The details are not important for this discussion, but in general, the more processing power working on building blocks, the stronger and more secure the network. There are benefits and drawbacks to a Proof of Work system. The drawbacks inspired the creation of a protocol known as Proof of Stake. In general, a Proof of Stake system uses the balance, or stake, of a node to compile a block and add it to the blockchain. We can surmise, accurately, that the more stake actively working on building blocks, the stronger and more secure the network. There are benefits and drawbacks to a Proof of Stake system, some of which are similar to Proof of Work systems and others which are unique. For this discussion, we will be focusing on one: In order to encourage nodes to participate in any blockchain system, rewards are distributed to the node which successfully compiles a block and adds it to the blockchain. The cost to a node for building a block in a Proof of Work system is the investment cost of hardware, the depreciation incurred by continuous operation of this hardware, and the electricity consumed by the operation of this hardware. The cost to a node for building a block for a Proof of Stake system, such as Gridcoin, is the time, hardware requirements, electricity required, and security issues involved with leaving a wallet with a balance connected to the network. Needless to say, the costs of a Proof of Stake system are much lower than those in a Proof of Work system, however they still exist. It is understandable that, given the opportunity, an entity would rather receive a reward without exposing itself to the cost of staking, or creating, a block. Currently, this is exactly how Gridcoin's reward mechanism works. Each coin in Gridcoin is guaranteed 1.5% interest per year whether it is working on creating blocks for the blockchain or sitting in a wallet not connected to the network. Beyond that, the reward for staking a block is equal to the fees collected from the transactions compiled in that block. Without getting into details, trust me when I say that the reward is tiny. This means that an entity with Gridcoin can collect its 1.5% interest without contributing to the creation or maintenance of the blockchain. We cannot blame entities which do this as it is the fault of the system. What we can do is change the system. A blockchain that suffers from the stake weight problem does not have a significant portion of its balance held on active nodes. This presents issues which I do not intend to get into for this article. In short, a blockchain with low stake weight is less secure than a blockchain with high stake weight. I hope that helped introduce a few of you to a major problem present in many Proof of Stake blockchains, Gridcoin being no exception. If you want to know more, do some research and ask the community! Thanks to @barton26 for proofreading this article.

    Option 7. No masternodes = ).
  5. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    I would love to see more analysis like the following. Note that Hotbit is the only person to put together a specific proposal for Constant Block Reward -- part of the 4.0 roadmap proposals. Masternode analysis: https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@hotbit/gridcoin-masternode-economy-a-step-to-oligarchy Here is their CBR proposal: https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@hotbit/gridcoin-production-supply-proposals-discussion Let's continue the discussion without forcing anything. In the meanwhile, let's bring everything else up to speed with some less dramatic changes. We are in no terrible rush. Are we?
  6. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    @nateonthenet I think it is important to keep in mind that a fork as we know and have seen in the past (with other coins, not Gridcoin) is not the only split that can occur. I do see your point about developers supporting the developments that are most supported by developers, I happen to say this all the time when we talk about a switch to graphene. "I do not know any developer that would code the switch." However, no one has ever created a legitimate poll regarding a switch to graphene. The conversation is ongoing, and I respect @C.M for his restraint as he continues to try to convince us that graphene is the best path forward and as we all continue to listen, learn, and observe. In the meanwhile, no one has tried to stop alternative improvements that can be implemented with relative pace as we explore other options. I have nothing against continuing to discuss masternodes and I am always open to being convinced one way or another, but as @shu said, there has already been multiple positive polls regarding the proposed updates put forward and developed by the community. Having a main, albeit sporadic, dev push masternode code in the face of developers will keep them away from other improvements that can be put in place with pace while we discuss masternodes -- with smaller improvements, there will not be a need to audit an entirely new system. It is a way to ensure one path as opposed to another without any conversation. It happens in politics all the time.
  7. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    @nateonthenet How many potential developers do you think are watching? How many do you think would never join a masternode community because they would never be able to propose and develop improvements? They would have to be hired by a masternode to work for Gridcoin development.
  8. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    I would recommending having a listen to this interview, and to watch if you can -- some interesting comments in the chat. There is a lot of good information in the interview. I will write my thoughts as I have them while listening so you can see my thought process. I will edit them mostly for typos and clarity -- so excuse me if I have a tone with a few of them. This will be my second time listening to this so these are not completely raw thoughts. -- "A portion of our transaction fees go to something other than mining." Afterwards, masternodes decide how to distribute these funds. -- We can do this, but without masternodes making the decisions about fund allocation. I can think of a few ways off the top of my head. Give me some time to make sure they seem like they could work and to make them presentable = ). I hope to have something released for community feedback by/around January 15th. -- "...anyone who wants to run one of these networks." -- We don't want to run a network, we want the network to run. It's a mentality. -- There is something to say about centralization speeding production, but it comes with a very large risk. Once you centralize at the core level, it is nearly impossible to decentralize. If you are centralized, you can be targeted. Governments, if they turn against anonymous networks, might target Dash masternodes, which are already legal unknowns. Consider Ancient Rome: before emperors, Rome was run by a senate. Rome was a republic -- decentralized/representative -- and would appoint a "Dictator" for times where the need for rapid production and reaction allowed by centralized control presented itself: mostly for wars or for the completion of hyper-specific tasks. After the war, or after the task was completed, or after a set length of time, the dictator was removed from power. Eventually, the system fell into complete centralization and power was given to something we call "Emperor." Get started with history! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_dictator -- It can be argued that it failed because they had a human system based solely on trust and not an open source algorithm based mostly on code. -- They are looking into building ASICs for their masternodes -- further centralization. -- Instant send sounds like an amazing mechanism, but it is not yet secure and its utility will undoubtedly be replicated through other mechanisms -- the ability to transact without waiting is necessary for all financial tools. -- Private Send seems pretty neat. If I understand correctly, an auditor can still identify a buyer with confidence, however it seems like they will need more than just the transaction data to confirm what they want to confirm. "We believe that this actor is bad. If they are one of the actors in this private send jumble, the probability that our belief is accurate increases." Something like that might be able to hold in a court of law? ... it sounds sort of like a warrant. -- "Does Dash Core have centralized control over the Dash network?" -- This question is never answered. There are some good statements about centralization when needed, but that's what they are: general statements one would expect from a politician, not a developer. See my comments about Rome above. There are other ways to implement temporary centralization to drive hyper-specific goal completion. I have several ideas. Give me some time to put them together and make them presentable = ). I hope to have theory and skeleton outlines regarding implementation for Gridcoin released for community feedback by/around January 31st. -- "... we could turn off a few features." "Very quickly... someone creates a new version of the network." Very quickly create a new version of the network?! Come now. Someone with more knowledge please correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems like it would take a lot of work and time to fix, fork, and rewind a network which was just corrupted by a rogue actor. Not to mention the loss of trust in the protocols and operation structures. -- Dash proposals are all about marketing and are generally... none are about development. Development is centralized. https://dashvotetracker.com/ https://www.dashcentral.org/budget -- Masternodes can turn off keys? Someone with more knowledge clarify this please. -- "Right now features like Instant Send are still maturing." "We need to reach a certain comfort level that these features have been tested enough...." I agree! Let's wait until they build the functions into the code and then take another look at the code! -- "We are not abusing that power and we have no plans to." Neat, but let's not rely on the indefinite benevolence of leaders. Let's think long term. Once all the amazing and benevolent leaders of organizations pass into the great unknown, can the system be corrupted? -- "We thought of use-case and designed for the use-case." He says this like it's ground-breaking. That's literally how Bitcoin was designed, yes? It's heuristic. You're supposed to start with and design off of absolute proofs or theory, not use-cases. Like Ouroboros. -- "There are a lot of different components that need to be built from scratch." Let them build them! Then let's look at a potential switch. -- "Let's. Do. It. Right." Yes. Yes. Yes. -- I agree with the microtransaction economy thought. That's pie in the sky dreaming for the next couple decades. Can't wait! After this they talk about stuff that's not necessarily relevant to Gridcoin... unless we actually go back to PoW, which I really hope we don't. After Thoughts: - The danger of Dash which I'm talking about are economic, political, and regarding the incomplete and insecure mechanisms that the proposal of this thread seeks to bring to Gridcoin. For cryptographic security, until I learn more, I deffer to the opinions of the developers who have earned the trust and respect of the community through their actions and products (never just their words). - Instant payments failed and the centralized team stopped services. Good for this security flaw scenario, bad in principal, particularly long term. - To me, masternodes sound like a bank and a human/trust-based-government in one entity. That is something that even the most hard core capitalists think is dangerous. They have thought this since the development of capitalist theory and the implementation of capitalism. - Maybe Masternodes will be the way to go, but I vote that we let them prove it first while also waiting to see what else people come up with to solve these problems. In the meanwhile, let's prove to all the people dedicated to science and open and accessible data analysis that we are here for them: let's work on BOINC and how we can structure our operation around our ethos. Disclaimer: I believe that the price of Dash is likely to skyrocket over the next 6-12 months (it may even have the potential to directly compete with BTC), but that doesn't mean it is right for Gridcoin at this time. There is a difference between being multi-billion dollar secure (which Dash admits they are not) and having groundbreaking tech. Most groundbreaking tech will be in smaller marketcap coins. Once those coins reach a billion dollar marketcap, their security will begin to be seriously tested. Just like what happened with Dash and the Instant Send mechanism.
  9. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    @jamescowens Incredible post. Thank you for your insight and for taking the time. The main point I think that needs to be made against masternodes is as follows: Why switch to untested solutions for incredibly complex problems, as you described. Blockchain technology is not yet 10 years old, yet we want to move away from the only hundred billion dollar secure protocols? This does not make sense to me. Second to that: There are serious failings of masternodes. Primarily, they present the opportunity to become a combination of the fiat banking system and the government structures which inspired the creation of blockchain technology in the first place. Why do we want to implement a potentially more efficient version of the system which blockchain tech is intended to disrupt? Why not continue with the protocol which is known, PoS, and which has known and studied flaws: centralization based on wealth. Centralization based on wealth is present in every single economic system in western society (and most others too), so we do not need to work to destroy that. Other, smarter people will do that for us. In fact, they are developing solutions at an unbelievable pace. So again, why not focus on the BOINC aspect of Gridcoin by fixing the vote weight situation you describe along with several other issues while maintaining the protocols and power structures we know to be more or less secure and stable. Additionally, mastersnodes will solve some problems, but with very risky potentials. All these problems can be solved through alternative means which are much less risky. Let's do the less risky solutions and wait for a year to see what is developed. Ouroboros is one protocol that is doing wonders when it comes to solving the wealth distribution problem regarding block creation. There are dozens more in development. This is also posted on steemit.
  10. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    That's the beauty of open-source. I bet we can get at least a few of them back by showing through our actions that we are here for the right reasons and will support their work as a community. And I'm certain we can get dozens, if not hundreds of brilliant, energetic, and passionate coders and front-enders on board to push a new wave of BOINC development into being. @Rob Halförd - (Gridcoin) ------------------------ This thread is getting very long, and this is a very long response, so to help people follow along I will link to huppdiwupp's original post, then to my response, then to huppdiwupp's response to my response: Original Post My Response Huppdiwupp's Response @huppdiwupp This is an incredibly complex question. I will do my best to explain how I see the value of Gridcoin and how that translates into price. I am going to start at the beginning, and I know you know a lot of what I'm going to say, but bear with me as I think this is an incredibly important part of the discussion regarding masternodes and the future of Gridcoin in general. Also, forgive me if I come off as condescending at times, I do not mean to. I have a didactic way of speaking which gets me into trouble more often than I'd like =). I respect everyone here and especially everyone with the courage to put themselves and their ideas out there, even if I don't agree with a particular idea. First, I'd like to explore where I think blockchain/Gridcoin value comes from: A blockchain is a set of code that guarantees an open ledger of information. Most contemporary blockchains also contain an incentive structure meant to encourage individuals and entities to help create and secure the open ledger of information. This incentive structure is not necessary for a blockchain to operate, however it has become a critical tool with regards to how blockchain tech is disrupting and improving age old economic and value systems and structures. As with anything that deals with money, it has also been abused for personal profit. So, it can be said that a coin created by securing an open ledger of information represents the value a collection of people attribute to the information in that ledger. Another word for "a collection of people" is "society". Just as a physical resource holds an exchange value equal to its perceived worth in a society, a coin minted by a blockchain holds an exchange value equal to a society's perceived worth of the data in the blockchain which minted the coin. A second way a blockchain is given value is through utility. "What can I do with the data in this blockchain?" First, I think we will agree that all open-source blockchains hold the utility of decentralized trust in structural algorithms manifested in code instead of arbitrary networks of trust. Beyond that, Bitcoin, for example, holds the intended utility of the rapid and inexpensive exchange of representative resource (cash). Ethereum holds the intended utility of scaleable and automated execution of contracts. Gridcoin's utility is still largely undefined, however I think it is currently close to what I have seen called "certificate of origin". This is likely the wrong term, or at least not the best term, so in other words: The data in the Gridcoin distributed and open ledger of information is largely transaction data (for the time being). This is no different than the data in the Bitcoin blockchain and holds the same utility and value potential as Bitcoin. The data which is unique to the Gridcoin blockchain is that which is found in Superblocks. Superblocks contain data related to Credits earned in the BOINC system. Credits are information meant to represent the value given to completed Work Units. Work Units are sets of data analyzed by processing power. Therefore, every Gridcoin can be said to represent, or originate from, a volume of processing power directed at the completion of Work Units. The value of a Gridcoin, it would follow, is the worth a society places on processing power directed at the completion of Work Units. This is not entirely accurate. Gridcoin is currently minted by two processes. The first process is the one I just described regarding completing work units. The second is the process of creating blocks, superblocks, and consensus on the blockchain. This process is also known as Securing the Blockchain. So, it would seem that the value of Gridcoin currently comes from three primary sources and one source connected to all open-source blockchains: Value Propositions: 1. The information contained in standard blocks. This is the ability to act as a rapid and inexpensive exchange of representative resource (cash). 2. The information contained in Superblocks. This is the ability to mint Gridcoin based on the volume of processing power directed at the completion of Work Units. 3. The creation of blocks, superblocks, and consensus on the blockchain. This is the ability of anyone to gather and verify the information in 1 and 2. Changing any of these three propositions changes the value of Gridcoin. Change is always necessary and often inevitable. The challenge is in determining how proposed changes affect these sources of value. If the ability to gather and verify and control the information in 1 and 2 is changed from "anyone" to "those with money" or "those who are voted in" or "those who wear blue shirts on Tuesdays", we must determine how the perceived value of Gridcoin might change. 4. The fourth source of value which is relevant to all open-source blockchains is the code that runs everything. As an aside, this is something I think is beautiful in blockchain tech. We as a society are beginning to give direct value to code, code anyone can read, understand, and learn from. And if code is just an idea made possible (particularly blockchain code), can we say that we are beginning to give direct value to ideas? I don't know, it sure would be neat. Anyway, moving on... To the question. If the price goes up, assuming honesty in the market, it would mean that society has given more value to one, some, or all of these propositions. Unfortunately, but understandably, this assumption of an honest market is flawed at best in the current cryptosphere. Let us not forget that when stocks were first created, they went through a very similar processes of abuse and regulation development, so in time, it is likely that this assumption will be made true. Now, if the price of GRC goes up, I think and am likely wrong on a few of these: 1. First, foremost, and most beneficial, any increase in price of GRC will likely encourage those holding GRC to risk committing more time to the development of Gridcoin: "If I am sitting on a million dollars, why shouldn't I quit my job and help ensure the security of this value while also developing something I believe in?" 2a. If the price of GRC increases because people are buying GRC as a tool to profit (buy low sell high), the value attributed to a specific volume of processing power will not change. *If I earn 5 GRC per 5GHz when the price of GRC is $1, and the price of GRC goes up to $5, I will earn 1 GRC per 5GHz. I will not earn more for my processing power. See #3 (below). Volatility and time are factors. * These values and units are just fillers to show the point. 2b. If the price of GRC increases because the perceived worth of processing power increases, it could be safe to say that you will earn more GRC/GHz, despite of #3 (below). Volatility and time are factors. 2c. If the price of GRC increases because people are buying GRC to create masternodes, the value attributed to GRC by value proposition #3 (above) will shift. The long term effects of this shift are unknown (masternodes are relatively new) and not even theorized in the proposal put forward by Rob, which is why I am very hesitant to support it. 2d. If the price of GRC increases because individuals and entities are buying GRC to help cause the first effect of this list to happen (a form of investment that may or may not be legally dubious), I think it is hard to say what will happen long term, but short term the same as 2a. The value of my GHz directed at completing WU will not change. 3. Any increase in price will bring more users to BOINC and Gridcoin. More users means more processing power directed at WU completion, awesome. Regarding earning more money for BOINCing: with our current system, this means a reduction of Magnitude for users across the board. This means everyone earns fewer GRC/GHz. But these GRC are worth more USD. But maybe I don't want USD. Or maybe I want more BTC -- how has that relationship changed? Because crypto markets are volatile, young, and because it is possible to use only a few Cryptos to live, and because you can convert only a few cryptos to usable cash, it is difficult to say with confidence how a change in price affects earnings. This is why things get complicated. -------- I agree with you for the most part, and I agree 100% with the shared value of burning GRC, however I think an "advertise by burn" funding structure does not coincide with the overall ethos of Gridcoin. It benefits those with financial support because they will be able to advertise their work while those without financial support will not. I fear any structure that might lead to the exclusion of those "without". I do not think it is a matter of developing a system that benefits the poor over the rich. I think it is a matter of developing and maintaining a system of equal opportunity. It is easy to cater to those with financial support without realizing that the structure developed excludes those without financial support. It happens in politics all the time. This is a fear of mine, and fear often leads to irrational decision making, so I am very open to being corrected here. ------ I think that over the next year we should focus on three major flaws of the current Gridcoin system. 1. Voting (the voting system, not data consensus) 2. Funding 3. Organization Regarding funding, one idea I've been mulling over is inspired by PINK. They call it sidestaking. Sidestaking Sidestaking is based on the idea that people are more likely to donate if: A. they never actually hold the money, meaning they never actually need to let go of the money B. the process is automatic Sidestaking is a mechanism that automatically distributes funds to a wide array of possible individuals, entities, and projects. This can be implemented in the staking rewards structures, research reward structure, transaction fees structures, and/or any fee structure. Sidestaking might present a fair and secure way to fund BOINC projects, Gridcoin marketing campaigns, bounty based developments, faucets, general research, charities and relief efforts, personal projects, and other endeavors. Fund distribution could be manual, automatic, static, dynamic, or a combination, and could be tied into the network and its economic requirements. Still lots to consider, but this is what I'm thinking as it stands. This would help development by helping fund bounty proposals and developers directly. Here is an example for each: 1. "Hello Gridcoin community! I have been thinking about a new way to do X / I have been thinking about a way to solve problem X. Here is what I have so far and I think it seems promising. Unfortunately, I do not have time/skill/desire to bring this idea to completion. I have set up a sidestaking address for the endeavor. You can find the requirements for the release of the funds in this contract. If you think it is something worth developing, you can automatically send a portion of your stake/BOINC rewards to ABC123 by using the sidestake tab in the GUI." At some point, if the idea is supported by the community, the bounty will be large enough to incentivize someone/a group to develop the idea. 2. "Hello Gridcoin community! I/we am/are a developer/s of Gridcoin. This is what we have done in the past. This is who we are. These are people we have worked with who can vouch for our character, work ethic, and intentions. Here are some threads that show you our development process. We would like to spend more time contributing to Gridcoin, but cannot afford to sacrifice our other sources of income. If you like our work and would like to support us, you can automatically send a portion of your stake/BOINC rewards to ABC123 by using the sidestake tab in the GUI. Here is the contract that defines how funds are released from the address." The Process (again, just some early thoughts): 1. A user/entity seeking funding verifies themselves in some way - IP address? True identification if they'd like? Some way that ensures that they can be removed from the system or punished should they break contracts or attempt to game the system. 2. The user/entity seeking funding then applies for a sidestaking address through a process, ideally automated -- similar to an automated whitelist/greylist. 3. Other users -- BOINCers and stakers -- can then direct their client to automatically allocate x% of their BOINC/stake rewards to any registered address or addresses they want. For example: I could direct 5% to the GRC foundation, 5% to BOINC project A, 5% to BOINC project B, 2% to faucet C, 10% to crowdfunding project D, 5% to bounty E, 5% to developer F, etc. This might create something like a marketplace of development, philanthropy, and education where those who create more value in the Gridcoin blockchain -- BOINCers and those who secure the blockchain -- choose the path of Gridcoin by allocating funds to different endeavors, endeavors which are able to convince users of their value. BOINC projects that more people like will receive more funds and might be able to gather more data and create more results. Proposed developments that more people like will receive more funds and will be more likely to be developed. People will also build reputation based on how they sidestake. Projects/endeavors/developers will be encouraged to educate the userbase (or hire someone to educate -- which in turn increases the userbase) in order to earn their sidestake funds. Philanthropy will become a regular talking point in the community along with education. Sidestaking is an open marketplace of ideas, masternodes is the wealthy making all decisions. ------ Broken, but what exists throughout the world already =). First, yes I agree that any PoS is pragmatically not a true democracy for the reason of more money = more power. But consider where that money came from. It came from securing the blockchain, which is the primary value proposition of most blockchains (compared with where money comes from in fiat systems -- "arbitrary law"). Not with Gridcoin! What if contributing to the primary purpose of Gridcoin (BOINCing/distributed data analysis) gives you power equal to or greater than contributing to securing the blockchain. In other words, 10 mag = 10 power while 10 GRC =7.5 power, or something. Assuming the problem of money = power is worked out (which in all honesty, this is how most systems created throughout history have operated and continue to operate, so to think that we must solve this legacy issue immediately might be self-defeating), this is how a DPoS could work, it is not how they all do or will work: In DPoS, as I understand it, an individual seeks to be one of the group of people who secures the blockchain, called Delegates. To do this, they must adhere to an "algorithmic constitution" of sorts which is ratified by the community and can be changed by the community. Delegates must also maintain a certain level of, let's call it "user support". Delegates are immediately and automatically removed from power if they break a law in the algorithmic constitution or if their user support drops below a certain level. If this happens, delegates will automatically be replaced by a delegate candidate on a waiting list. Users who do not wish to be delegates, or who do not wish to follow every little aspect of Gridcoin (which is a lot of people and understandably so), offer their power to a delegate candidate who has earned their trust. This is just like how many democracies have people elect representatives to make decisions for them -- a representative democracy. There are clearly flaws to this system, just like in all representative democracy systems past and present. Some of these flaws are very similar to those of masternode systems, just as oligarchy manages to corrupt contemporary democracies, however in masternode systems there is no way for the "littles" to team up against those who have enough resources to buy into the system. In other words, once you show that you have enough money to become a masternode, you are masternode for life or until the protocol is changed to require even more investment to maintain your power. In DPoS, you must follow a constitution ratified by everyone, and if you fail to serve your constituents best interests, you can be removed from power.
  11. New Coin Launch Announcement - GRC - GridCoin

    Gridcoin State of the Network Report. November 25th, 2017 https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-state-of-the-network-report-11-25-17
  12. New Coin Launch Announcement - GRC - GridCoin

    Gridcoin 4.0-2018 Roadmap Progress Report and November 18th Discussion Recording! https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-research-4-0-2018-roadmap-progress-report-and-november-18th-discussion-recording Direct link to the recording of the discussion on November 18th:
  13. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    @huppdiwupp @Frank0051 Nothing is that simple = ). I disagree. What we need is more use-cases for GRC. This is sort of what you go on to explain, but in a way that seems to benefit financially well-off entities and no one else. This is a subject for another day, however. I would recommend researching SideStaking by PINK, as one possible example. Its potential is incredible. DPoS is a representative democracy while Masternodes are oligarchic in structure. Graphene is not the only DPoS protocol. Let us not forget EOS and Ouroboros. 1. There are other ways! Possibly better ways! DWP is one. 2. Good point, but so would DPoS if I understand correctly. 3. In this scenario, Masternodes = DPoS Delegates -- I do not see the difference. DPoS nodes are voted in and can follow an algorithmic constitution written and ratified by everyone. If the network does not like what they are doing, or if they break any law in the constitution, they are removed from power. With masternodes, once you buy in, you're in. One is there to create blocks based on an agreed upon set of morals, ethics, and their corresponding laws, while the other is there to be controlled by those who have the most money. DPoS centralization is entirely different from masternode centralization. The former is representative democracy and the latter seems to be oligarchy. Please correct me if I'm wrong. Disclaimer: I do not support a switch to graphene at this time, however DPoS exists on several chains and not just graphene. I also do not support a switch to DPoS at this time as it is still new and has yet to be truly put through its paces. The main points I want to make in response to this are the following: 1. Graphene is not the only DPoS protocol. Let us not forget EOS and Ouroboros. 2. DPoS can be based on an open source algorithmically defined constitution which, depending on implementation, could or could not solve all of these issues. For example, what if the constitution demands the DPoS delegate hold 100,000 of the coin in an escrow account in order to be eligible? If at any point these coins are moved or spent, power is taken from the delegate. What if DPoS delegates are required to verify their identity through some process in order to be eligible? If at any point their IP changes (should the constitution call for static IP, for example) they are removed from power. So power is taken from delegates automatically if they break the constitution. Power is also taken from delegates if they lose the trust of people delegating power to them, or if another delegate offers better improvements to the blockchain thereby earning more delegated power. Your third point is far more complex. When you look at things pragmatically, PoS is already DPoS -- those with the most Stake make the blocks. DPoS acknowledges this element of PoS and puts laws in place to govern these entities of power. It then says to the little guy, "You get to choose which entity with stake gets to make the blocks. Write a constitution, ratify it, and keep it up to date. You, little fella, are actually in charge." One quick benefit to this system is that most people aren't going to want to mine or stake blocks on the block chain -- they will want to contribute to BOINC. DPoS acknowledges this and creates a system that gives them the power to choose who makes the blocks so that they can set up their software and check it maybe once a month. Masternodes give power to those with financial support, regardless of their actions and regardless of what those "without" think. @huppdiwupp since you generally support this proposal, could you explain how it will benefit BOINC, research, and the general goals pointed out by Quez? Or maybe break down exactly what masternodes do and how they function. Thank you! Disclaimer, I do not support a switch to graphene at this time, however DPoS exists on several chains and not just graphene. I also do not support a switch to DPoS at this time as it is still new and has yet to be truly put through its paces. @Quez In short, I think masternodes will be destructive to the ethos and long term development of Gridcoin, unless someone can convince me otherwise! @Rob Halförd - (Gridcoin) I would love to hear your thoughts regarding economic and political ramifications of masternodes. Additionally, I would like to see a breakdown of how many masternodes are desirable, how we would target that number, and why. Masternode systems do not arbitrarily choose a lease value. There is intention, expectation, and control. To those following along, note: PIVX is a fork of DASH. Essentially same codebase, granted it has some interesting additional features. Also, why would marketcap define quality of technology, particularly in the rapidly developing blockchain technology industry?
  14. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    Convince me that this is true. Frankly, I do not believe you. You know the intent of the argument (which in all honesty was pretty clear). Do not mislead. We are all -- all 2000-2500 of us -- statistics nerds with varying degrees of experience in programing, development, marketing, funding, research, education, blockchain tech, and more, and we each bring our individual networks -- each as valuable as the next -- to the table. In other words, don't build yourself up too tall = ). These are not the major problems seen by most users of Gridcoin. However, they are problems. But: there are solutions to many of these which are far more beneficial than masternodes, as has been discussed among the community for over 6 months. I think that if our goal is encourage people to connect their IPP to BOINC, this is a bad idea and, again, this is not a Proof of Research protocol, or really any protocol at all. You seem to be confusing blockchain protocol with incentive structure. What would happen is anyone who is able right now would set up their masternode. Future masternodes would require at least several tens of thousands of dollars, or more likely several hundreds of thousands of dollars. It currently costs ~$585,000 USD to set up a DASH masternode and $30,000 USD to set up a PIVX node. I would like to see a report regarding economic and political ramifications of masternodes. Additionally, I would like to see a breakdown of how many masternodes are desirable, how we would target that number, and why. ----------------------------------- Regarding the community developed proposals which we have been discussing, exploring, and developing as a community for the past 6 months, I would direct interested parties to the following link: https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/regarding-the-new-technology-rebase-poll-and-grc-4-0-2018-roadmap-proposals --------------------------------- Now. Who wants to chug some gravy?
  15. Gridcoin Future Technology Base

    Apologies for the posts in quick succession -- I lost the whole post and have had to write it from scratch. I keep noticing parts I forgot to put back in =). Proof of Research means building a blockchain based on the proof of research done. Just as Proof of Work is building a blockchain based on work done (hashing) and Proof of Stake is building a blockchain based on stake. A Proof of Research blockchain would require that at least 51% of the blocks in the chain are made based on research done. This Masternode proposal is not a proof of research algorithm -- 0% of the blocks will be made based on research done. This is not PoR.

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